This paper aims at measuring the loss in the value of a firm due to the gamble for resurrection, in a standard contingent claims model. Just before a debt repayment is due, the equityholders of a levered firm can decide to shut the firm down or to keep it as an ongoing concern. We study how leverage affects the operating decision and we provide a closed form formula for the associated agency costs. We show that yield spreads associated with defaultable bonds are higher than those obtained when ignoring the agency conflict.
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Paper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number
97.480.