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"Do Norms Against Threats have Real Effects? Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict"

Author

Listed:
  • Anbarci, N.
  • Skaperdas, S.
  • Syropoulos, C.

Abstract

In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in "guns") that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set. In such settings, with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set, it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in term of their efficiency properties. We compare bargaining solutions within a wide class in which the influence of the threat point on the bargaining outcome varies across solutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Anbarci, N. & Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1999. ""Do Norms Against Threats have Real Effects? Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict"," Papers 98-99-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:98-99-11
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    Cited by:

    1. P. Fortunato, 2001. "Cyclical Strikes and Human Capital Accumulation under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 419, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    BARGAINING ; GAME THEORY ; SOCIAL CHOICE;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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