Players' Information in Extensive Games
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs in its series Papers with number 393.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, RESEARCH PROGRAM IN APPLIED MACROECONOMICS AND MACRO POLICY, DAVIS CALIFORNIA 95616 U.S.A.
game theory ; economic models;
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- Quesada, Antonio, 2001. "On expressing maximum information in extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 161-167, September.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2009. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision," Working Papers 914, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
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