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Banque centrale independante avec un objectif propre: est-ce une organisation efficace?

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Author Info
Artus, P.
Abstract

Dans la plupart des pays, l'organisation monetaire est la suivante: la Banque Centrale est independante et est essentiellement en charge du controle de l'inflatin pas de grandeurs reelles (chomage, ...). Cette organisation est historiquement le plus souvent liee au souhait d'eviter le biais inflationniste qu'impliquerait l'absence d'independance, mais elle aboutit a ce que l'objectif de la Banque Centrale soit different de l'objectif social. Dans cet article, nous examinons le cheminement (dans la reflexion et la litterature economique) par lequel on est parvenu a ce type d'organisation, nous le critiquons et nous montrons, en illustrant le propos par un modele theorique simple, qu'il est un peu justifiable, meme si les gouvernement presentent aussi des biais de comportement, c'est-a-dire ont aussi un objectif different de celui qui serait souhaitable pour parvenir a l'optimum social.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Caisse des Depots et Consignations - Cahiers de recherche in its series Papers with number 2000-50/ma.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:cadeco:2000-50/ma

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Postal: Caisse des depots et consignations, Services des etudes economiques et financieres, 195 Boulevard Saint Germain- 75007 Paris, France.

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Related research
Keywords: POLITIQUE MONETAIRE ; BANQUES CENTRALES;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.


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