Competitive Equilbrium: Walras Meets Darwin
AbstractPrime objects of this note are (I) excess demand generated by price-taking economic agents, and (II) an alternative version of tatonnement. We relate laws of demand, axioms of revealed preferences, and other notions of generalized monotonicity to evolutionary stable prices. Focus is on local stability of competitive equilibrium. Specifically, we establish that evolutionary stable prices are asymptotically attractive under so-called replicator dynamics.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 209.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ; COMPETITION ; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS;
Other versions of this item:
- Flam, S.D. & Sandvik, B., 1999. "Competitive Equilibrium: Walras Meets Darwin," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0699, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
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- Sjur Didrik Flåm, 2002.
"Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
672, CESifo Group Munich.
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