338: Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: The Real Effects of Contract Bargaining. 339: New Palgrave Dictionary of Law & Economics Entry: Judgement-Proofness
338: I examine the standard assumption in the moral hazard agency literature that the principal has all the bargaining power at the contract offer stage. When the agent has limited liability, as is often the case in practice, the contract changes according to the distribution of bargaining power, and consequently so does the agents effort. --- 339: A party is said to be judgement-proof if she avoids the full degree of liability she should rightly face. There are several ways an individual can do this. Before the case comes to court, and after the accident has been caused, she can expend resources either to deter or to escape court action.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Australian National University - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
338-339.
Length: 18 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:aunaec:338-339
Contact details of provider: Postal: THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, RESEARCH SCHOOL of PACIFIC STUDIES, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, G.P.O. 4, CANBERRA ACT 2601 AUSTRALIA..O. BOX 4 CANBERRA 2601 AUSTRALIA. Web page: http://economics.anu.edu.au/economics.htm More information through EDIRC
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