This paper presents a two-party dynamic model of optimal fiscal policy which integrates stabilizing electroral and partisan motives.
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Paper provided by Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies in its series Athens University of Economics and Business with number
97-04.
Length: 25 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:athebu:97-04
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