Cet article etudie les consequences d'un altruisme non reciproque et demontre que l'exploitation du samaritain par le beneficiaire depend du niveau d'altruisme et non du montant des transferts. Un modele caracterise les conditions dans lesquelles un dilemme du prisonnier se transforme en un dilemme du samaritain.
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Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number
98c02.
Length: 14 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:98c02
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