This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a class of games of group formation. The use of potential allows for a characterisation of such an equilibrium.
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Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number
98a18.
Length: 6 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:98a18
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects