We consider the labour market implications of skill decay. State dependence in individual hazards emerges from the joint result of (optimal) hiring and search behaviours. We shed light on an original externality according to which firms' profits increase with the valuation of vacancies. Consequently, there can be multiple equilibria, those of which displaying the longest duration of employability also entail the least search efforts. Policies aimed at reducing long-term unemployment generally discourage search efforts, so that their results are ambiguous.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number
00a14.
Length: 26 pages Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:00a14
Contact details of provider: Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE. Phone: 04.91.14.07.70 Fax: 04.91.90.02.27 Email: Web page: http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/GREQAM/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).