Rules Versus Discretion: Favouritism and the Use of Requirements of Formal Qualifications
AbstractThe recruitment of new employees is analysed in a theoritical model. It is shown that it can be optimal to implement requirements of formal qualifications for jobs, although it would be possible for the manager to find applicants who have a higher expected ability but no formal qualifications.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 98-12.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Faculty of Business Administration. The Aarhus School of Business. Fuglesangs Alle 4. DK- 8210 Aarhus V - Denmark
Phone: +45 89 486396
Fax: +45 8615 5175
Web page: http://www.asb.dk/about/departments/nat.aspx
More information through EDIRC
ASYMETRIC INFORMATION ; LABOUR MARKET ; RECRUITMENT;
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