Signalling in International Environmental Agreements: Using Pre-Agreement Emission Level as a Signalling Device
AbstractThis paper addresses the question about strategic incentives in international environmental agreements and tries to give a positive description of how the design of the agreement influences the strategic behaviour of potential participants before they enter the treaty. A common feature of the design of agreements is that the reduction obligations (RO) are made contingent on a pre-agreement or baseline emission. As it is assumed that countries posses better information about their reduction costs than does the international body in charge of deciding the RO, countries might have incentivesto signal higher costs by increasing their baseline emission, and thereby reducing the costs of entering the agreement...
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 97-9.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Faculty of Business Administration. The Aarhus School of Business. Fuglesangs Alle 4. DK- 8210 Aarhus V - Denmark
Phone: +45 89 486396
Fax: +45 8615 5175
Web page: http://www.asb.dk/about/departments/nat.aspx
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GAME THEORY ; INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY ; ENVIRONMENT;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
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