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Signalling in International Environmental Agreements: Using Pre-Agreement Emission Level as a Signalling Device

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  • Steiner, U.
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    Abstract

    This paper addresses the question about strategic incentives in international environmental agreements and tries to give a positive description of how the design of the agreement influences the strategic behaviour of potential participants before they enter the treaty. A common feature of the design of agreements is that the reduction obligations (RO) are made contingent on a pre-agreement or baseline emission. As it is assumed that countries posses better information about their reduction costs than does the international body in charge of deciding the RO, countries might have incentivesto signal higher costs by increasing their baseline emission, and thereby reducing the costs of entering the agreement...

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 97-9.

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    Length: 39 pages
    Date of creation: 1997
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:fth:aascbu:97-9

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Department of Economics, Faculty of Business Administration. The Aarhus School of Business. Fuglesangs Alle 4. DK- 8210 Aarhus V - Denmark
    Phone: +45 89 486396
    Fax: +45 8615 5175
    Web page: http://www.asb.dk/about/departments/nat.aspx
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    Keywords: GAME THEORY ; INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY ; ENVIRONMENT;

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