This paper analyses the importance of informational asymmetries in international environmental regulation by use of a game theoretic approach of signalling games.
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Paper provided by Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
97-2.
Length: 28 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:aascbu:97-2
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Faculty of Business Administration. The Aarhus School of Business. Fuglesangs Alle 4. DK- 8210 Aarhus V - Denmark Phone: +45 89 486396 Fax: +45 8615 5175 Web page: http://www.asb.dk/about/departments/nat.aspx More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General