Privatisation is often explained by a desire to achieve efficiency. This paper presents conditions under which political interference yields higher welfare than under commercial objectives, and vice versa. If effort affects utility, interference may be beneficial in a seemingly perfect market.
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Paper provided by Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
00-6.
Length: 31 pages Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:aascbu:00-6
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Boundaries of Public and Private Enterprise; Privatization; Contracting Out L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations