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Asymmetric default bias in dishonesty – how defaults work but only when in one’s favor

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  • Toke Reinholt Fosgaard

    ()
    (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

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    Abstract

    Based on a dice rolling task where participants can cheat on the outcome, this paper asks if default answers change dishonesty? The paper finds that various default answers have asymmetric effects. Compared to not having a default answer at all, providing a low default answer, or adding the expected mean as the default answer when participants report the outcome of the task do not affect behavior. Adding a high default answer, however, significantly increases the reported outcome.

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    File URL: http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/WPpdf/WP2013/IFRO_WP_2013_8.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics in its series IFRO Working Paper with number 2013/8.

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    Length: 10 pages
    Date of creation: Apr 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:foi:wpaper:2013_8

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    Web page: http://www.ifro.ku.dk/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Dice task; Cheating; Default bias;

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