Executive compensation at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
AbstractCorporate governance-and executive-compensation arrangements in particular-should be an important component of the agenda to reform the housing GSEs. The GSEs' safety-and-soundness regulator-who is essentially the debtholders' and taxpayers' representative-must be admitted to the GSEs' boardroom in a way that is atypical of an ordinary publicly held company. This intrusion into the board's oversight of executive-compensation plans is justified given the GSEs' public purposes and their large potential cost to taxpayers. Prudent public policy requires greater supervisory control over executive compensation at the GSEs, which would follow a precedent set in banking.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its series Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Papers with number 2004-06.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2005-05-23 (Business Economics)
- NEP-URE-2005-05-23 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- William Poole, 2007. "The GSEs: where do we stand?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 143-152.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Xiao Xiaohong) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Xiao Xiaohong to update the entry or send us the correct address.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.