Inflation expectations and the transmission of monetary policy
AbstractNew Keynesian models with sticky prices and rational expectations have a difficult time explaining why reducing inflation usually requires a recession. An explanation for the costliness of reducing inflation is that inflation expectations are less than perfectly rational. To explore this possibility, I estimate the degree of nonrationality implicit in two survey measures of inflation expectations. I find that the surveys reflect an intermediate degree of rationality: Expectations are nether perfectly rational nor as unsophisticated as simple autoregressive models would suggest. I also find that a structural New Keynesian model with expectations formation based on the survey results is able to match closely the empirical costs of reducing inflation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series Finance and Economics Discussion Series with number 1998-43.
Date of creation: 1998
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