Hyperinflations and moral hazard in the appropriation of seigniorage: an empirical implementation with a calibration approach
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in its series Working Papers with number 9517.
Date of creation: 1995
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- Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2006. "The advantage of transparency in monetary policy instruments," Staff Report 297, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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- Pekarski, Sergey, 2011. "Budget deficits and inflation feedback," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-11, February.
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