Limited liability and the development of capital markets
AbstractWe study the consequences of the introduction of widespread limited liability for corporations. In the traditional view, limited liability reduces transactions costs and enhances investment incentives for individuals and firms. But this view does not explain several important stylized facts of the British experience, including the slow rate of adoption of limited liability by firms in the years following legal reforms. We construct an alternative model that accounts for this and other features of the nineteenth century British experience. In the model, project risk is private information, and a firm’s decision to adopt limited liability may be interpreted in equilibrium as a signal the firm is more likely to default. Hence less risky firms may choose unlimited liability or forego investments entirely. We show the choice of liability rule can lead to "development traps," in which profitable investments are not undertaken, through its effect on equilibrium beliefs of uninformed investors in the economy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 0703.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-04-28 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2007-04-28 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-PPM-2007-04-28 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Robert E. Wright, 2010. "Rise of the Corporation Nation," NBER Chapters, in: Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s, pages 217-258 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lee Faulhaber).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.