Coalitions, power, and the FOMC
AbstractThe authors apply a notion of power, defined for coalitions, which is derived from the Shapley value. They calculate the power of coalitions within a 12-person committee meant to correspond to the FOMC.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 0103.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-06-08 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Harsanyi,John C., 1986. "Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521311830, December.
- Ansgar Belke & Barbara Schnurbein, 2012. "European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 289-323, April.
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