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Central Banks And Financial Supervision; New Tendencies

Author

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  • Elisabetta Montanaro

    (Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology)

Abstract

The post-crisis political and theoretical developments have produced a profound reappraisal of central banks’ mandate in achieving and maintaining financial stability. This evolution has had important consequences for the institutional architecture of financial supervision and for the role assigned to central banks within it. The paper aims to analyse the rationale of this evolution and to what extent it has characterised the reforms introduced by EU countries after the crisis. The empirical analysis confirms the wider mandate for financial stability given to EU central banks, mainly in those countries whose structural vulnerabilities arise from high degree of financialisation. The reforms associated to this process always result from political choices: in this respect, the different path towards the new architecture, which has characterised the UK and Germany can be taken as the two most interesting cases. They show the complex interactions between political pressure, resistance and ambitions of the various existing authorities, and the country’s heritage, which characterise every stage of institutional reform, especially where significant supervisory failures have been found.

Suggested Citation

  • Elisabetta Montanaro, 2016. "Central Banks And Financial Supervision; New Tendencies," Working papers wpaper134, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
    • Handle: RePEc:fes:wpaper:wpaper134
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Elisabetta Montanaro, 2016. "The process towards centralisation of the European financial supervisory architecture: The case of the Banking Union," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 69(277), pages 135-172.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    models of financial supervision; twin-peaks; central banks; financial reforms; Bank of England; Bundesbank; EU countries;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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