When Inertia Generates Political Cycles
AbstractWe propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the election a consecutive infinite number of times.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2006.91.
Date of creation: Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Political Cycles; Inertia;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-07-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-07-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MAC-2006-07-21 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-07-21 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-07-21 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Nicolas Houy, 2007. "When inertia generates political cycles: a remark," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(16), pages 1-5.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:16:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
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