Simultaneous Elections and Economic Turnout in Spanish Regional Elections

Low voter turn-out questions the legitimacy of modern democracies in pursuing some desired goals of political inclusion and legitimacy. Yet, in examining the determinants of individuals' participation, rational voting models assume that participation in elections is an exogenous feature whereby individuals participate if the net benefits are sizeable. In this paper we argue that, in certain circumstances, turn-out might be endogenously influenced by an incumbent government that is able to decide on the election date. This holds true where incumbent politicians can potentially influence the appropriate calendar of an election. In particular, we look at the influence of simultaneity in elections on voter turnout. Furthermore, we examine the role economic variables play in influencing voter turn out (economic turnout). Our data is from Spanish regional elections between 1980-1999 and we use panel data models . We define several notions of simultaneity depending on the coincidence of regional elections with alternative election dates (municipal, national and European elections). Findings point out that simultaneity systematically increases individuals average turn-out regardless of the elections considered and that economic conditions might exert some influence in the turnout in Spanish regional elections.