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How much of Federalism in the European Union

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Author Info
František Turnovec () (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) is not de jure a federation, but after 50 years of institutional evolution it possesses attributes of a federal state. One can conclude that EU is “something between” federation and intergovernmental organization. If we measure “something between” by interval [0, 1], where 0 means fully intergovernmental organization and 1 means de facto federation, the questions are: What is the location of recent EU on this interval? What tendency of development of this location can be observed in time? In this paper we propose such a measure based on game-theoretical model of European Union decision making system.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its series Working Papers IES with number 2009/19.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision: Jun 2009
Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2009_19

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Related research
Keywords: Co-decision procedure; committee system; consultation procedure; European Union decision making; federation; intergovernmental organization; qualified majority; power indices; simple voting committee;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

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