The Strategic Euro Laggards
AbstractA government applying for a club membership may strategically delay entry to cope with the hold-up problem introduced by anticipatory investments of the private sector. In equilibrium of a two-period incomplete information game, we find that a pro-entry government may strategically delay to imitate an anti-entry government and thereby affect expectations of the private sector. The delay is more likely if the government has a good electoral prospect, is internationally weak, and is not considered to be too keen on entry. The model is related to the case of the Czech Republic where the government recently softened commitment in the euro adoption strategy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its series Working Papers IES with number 2008/16.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision: Sep 2008
EMU; club enlargement; international unions; bargaining;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
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- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
- F50 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
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- NEP-MAC-2008-09-20 (Macroeconomics)
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