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Market distortions and corporate governance

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Author Info

  • David Kelsey

    (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)

  • Frank Milne

    (Department of Economics, Queens University, Canada.)

Abstract

This paper studies corporate governance when a firm operates in imperfect markets. We derive firms' decisions from utility maximisation by individuals. This reduces the usual monopoly distortion. Corporate governance can effect the equilibrium in the product (or input) markets. This enables us to endogenise the objective function of the firm. If the firm cannot commit not to change its constitution, we find a Coase-like result where all market power is lost in the limit. We present a more abstract model of governance in the presence of market distortions and discuss its implications for the governance of universities.

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File URL: http://people.exeter.ac.uk/cc371/RePEc/dpapers/DP0503.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Exeter University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0503.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:0503

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Keywords: corporate governance; stakeholder; strategic delegation; economics of universities.;

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