IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ewp/wpaper/386web.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The nucleolus of the assignment game. Structure of the family

Author

Listed:
  • F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

  • Carlos Rafels

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

  • Neus Ybern

    (Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya)

Abstract

We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus forms a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element. The above family is in general not a convex set, but path-connected.

Suggested Citation

  • F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz & Carlos Rafels & Neus Ybern, 2018. "The nucleolus of the assignment game. Structure of the family," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2018/386, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ewp:wpaper:386web
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/127510
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Assignment game; core; nucleolus; semilattice.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ewp:wpaper:386web. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: University of Barcelona School of Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feubaes.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.