In a standard framework of international monetary policy games we show that countries will prefer to split up into several coalition blocs of a smaller size rather than forming one big coalition. Depending on the strategic position between the coalitions in an equilibrium there will be either only coalitions of the same size or the 'leading' coalition will be smaller that the 'follower' coalition. A possible application of these results is the formation of currency blocs.
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Paper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number
eco97/31.
Length: 74 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco97/31
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy