The political economy of fixed regional investment shares with an illustration for Belgian Railway investments
AbstractMany local public goods are allocated by federal governments using fixed regional shares: every region is entitled a fixed share of the total budget for a particular type of public good. This paper compares this fixed regional sharing rule with two alternative allocation rules: first best and common pool allocation. We find that the fixed regional sharing rule performs relatively well if the regional shares are reasonable. Legislative bargaining theory is used to study the determination of the fixed regional shares.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën in its series Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers with number ces10.05.
Date of creation: Feb 2010
Date of revision:
local public goods; political economy; railways;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-GEO-2010-12-23 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-POL-2010-12-23 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2010-12-23 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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