Feeding the Leviathan
AbstractUsing a step-level public good game, we analyze the e.ects on contributions of having played under a sanctioning regime. We find that "educational" effects, in terms of learning a particular way to coordinate towards "good" equilibria, are more relevant than motivational "crowding out" effects, whereby cooperating to avoid sanctions spoils intrinsic incentives. If groups vote, they decide to remove the costly sanctioning regime; then they cooperate as much as in automatic removal only when this decision entails a clear "trust" message.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research in its series IESA Working Papers Series with number 0404.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Public Good; Step-level; Sanctioning Institution; Cooperation; Education; Trust;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luis Miguel Miller) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Luis Miguel Miller to update the entry or send us the correct address.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.