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Feeding the Leviathan

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  • Pablo Guillén

    ()

  • Christiane Schwieren
  • Gianandrea Staffiero

Abstract

Using a step-level public good game, we analyze the e.ects on contributions of having played under a sanctioning regime. We find that "educational" effects, in terms of learning a particular way to coordinate towards "good" equilibria, are more relevant than motivational "crowding out" effects, whereby cooperating to avoid sanctions spoils intrinsic incentives. If groups vote, they decide to remove the costly sanctioning regime; then they cooperate as much as in automatic removal only when this decision entails a clear "trust" message.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research in its series IESA Working Papers Series with number 0404.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esa:iesawp:0404

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Web page: http://www.d-andalucia.csic.es/iesa.htm
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Related research

Keywords: Public Good; Step-level; Sanctioning Institution; Cooperation; Education; Trust;

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