The Political Economy of Post-Conflict Reform in Arab Societies

This paper offers a simple analytical framework on the political economy of post-conflict reform in Arab societies. Highlighting the importance of temporality, we argue that policies towards postconflict reform need to be cognizant of how power was distributed prior to conflict, how the configuration of power shifts during the conflict, and what are the likely impacts of current policy interventions on future political equilibria. We also emphasize the need to recognize and address the multiple commitment challenges and coordination failures inherent in instituting post-conflict reform. Post-conflict institution building also ought to explicitly recognize the complexity and contradictions of the reform space, and the interests and incentives of various actors involved. This requires a shift of emphasis away from idealized institutional outcomes (e.g. elections, transparency, control of corruption, etc.) to intermediate processes. We conclude the paper by outlining the key features of macroeconomic policy reform in this brittle political economy context. In this regard, we highlight the need to avoid the time inconsistency problem where policies that are optimal in the short-run may not be perceived to be optimal in the long-run and therefore remain unimplemented