Subprime Rescue Plans: Backdoor Bank Bailouts
AbstractThis report analyzes recent proposals suggesting that the government buy up or guarantee bad mortgage debt in an attempt to slow the increasing number of foreclosures the nation has seen in the wake of the housing market's meltdown. The study, which focuses on the plan put forth by the Office of Thrift Supervision, shows that banks and mortgage holders end up being the true beneficiaries of such plans at the expense of taxpayers and with few gains for the majority of homeowners currently facing foreclosure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in its series CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs with number 2008-07.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
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foreclosure; mortgage; subprime;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G - Financial Economics
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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