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Contracts and domination in incomplete markets

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  • Marakulin Valery

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Abstract

A domination concept, based on the notion of an exchange contract, is proposed and studied in this paper. Doing so, the classical notion of domination via coalitions is transmitted onto systems (webs) of contracts and onto allocations, whose stability is investigated. This way, the proposed concept of a core for incomplete markets is described as a set of allocations realized by the webs of contracts that have a special kind of stability relative to the breaking of existing contracts and relative to the ability to sign new contracts. This concept converts into classical core when the market turns complete. Under perfect competition conditions, core allocations are equilibria. These properties prove that the studied core concept is valid.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS in its series EERC Working Paper Series with number 02-04e.

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Length: 86 pages
Date of creation: 24 Sep 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:02-04e

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Postal: EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS, 1, Mazepy Str., suite 202, Kyiv, 01010 Ukraine
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Related research

Keywords: Russia; incomplete markets; core; contract; contractual allocation; competitive equilibrium;

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Cited by:
  1. Valery M. Marakulin, 2009. "Economies with Asymmetrically Informed Agents: the Concept of Limit Information," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 1-2, pages 62-85.
  2. Marakulin, V.M., 2013. "On the Edgeworth conjecture for production economies with public goods: A contract-based approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 189-200.
  3. Marakulin Valery, 2006. "On convergence of contractual trajectories in pure exchange economies," EERC Working Paper Series 06-07e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.

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