The Stability of Price Dispersion under Seller and Consumer Learning (first version)
AbstractIn many markets it is possible to find rival sellers charging different prices for the same good. Earlier research has attempted to explain this phenomenon by demonstrating the existence of dispersed price equilibria when consumers must make use of costly search to discover prices. We ask whether such equilibria can be learnt when sellers adjust proces adaptively in response to current market conditions. With consumer behaviour fixed, convergence to a dispersed porce equilibrium is possible in some cases. However, once consumer learning is introduced, the monopoly outcome first found by Diamond (1971) is the only stable equilibrium.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 45.
Date of creation: Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Learning; Evolution; Search; Price Dispersion;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gina Reddie).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.