An Experimental Study of Information in Bargaining
AbstractScores of experimental studies in two player bargaining games have shown the importance of fair outcomes in complete information environments. However, the case of complete information may be a special case, both in terms of the amount of information the players have, and the fact that they can compare relative profits from trade. Our new design allows us to manipulate the information a bargainer has about the value of a trade for the other party. The results of the experiments permit us to identify the value of information for each party, and its role in determining efficiency and the distribution of profits. We also discuss the importance of fairness when players lack information about each others payoffs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number 655.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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