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# Noisy evolution in normal form games

## Author Info

• Christoph Kuzmics

## Abstract

This paper analyzes a stochastic model of evolution in normal form games. The long-run behavior of individuals in this model is investigated in the limit where mutation rates tend to zero, while the expected number of mutations, and hence population sizes, tend to infinity. It is shown that weakly dominated strategies do not survive evolution. Also strategies which are not rationalizable in the game obtained from the original game by the deletion of all weakly dominated strategies disappear in the long-run. Furthermore it is shown that if evolution leads to a unique prediction this prediction must be equivalent to a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.

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## Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings with number 50.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:latm04:50

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## Related research

Keywords: learning; experimentation; $W^1S^{\infty}$-procedure;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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