Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Welfare Properties of Network Bypass

Contents:

Author Info

  • Richard Martin

Abstract

One result of the deregulation of utilities in New Zealand has been the bypass of existing networks. We investigate two cases of bypass in the distribution of natural gas, and compare the welfare properties of regulation vs.\ the `laissez-faire' equilibrium. We demonstrate that installing a redundant bypass can be simultaneously profitable and socially undesirable. Bypass is costly, but it reduces market power and increases the variety of goods available to consumers. Regulation is an alternative mechanism to discipline the behavior of the incumbent, but provides no variety to consumers. We find that desirability of the two regulatory regimes depends critically on the degree of differentiation between the existing and potential network. Both marginal and average cost price regulation are considered

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings with number 22.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:ausm04:22

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: regulation; entry; welfare; efficiency; CES;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:ausm04:22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.