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The Missed Opportunity and Challenge of Capital Regulation

Author

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  • Admati, Anat R.

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

Capital regulation is critical to address distortions and externalities from intense conflicts of interest in banking and from the failure of markets to counter incentives for recklessness. The approaches to capital regulation in Basel III and related proposals are based on flawed analyses of the relevant tradeoffs. The flaws in the regulations include dangerously low equity levels, complex and problematic system of risk weights that exacerbates systemic risk and adds distortions, and unnecessary reliance on poor equity substitutes. The underlying problem is a breakdown of governance and lack of accountability to the public throughout the system, including policymakers and economists.

Suggested Citation

  • Admati, Anat R., 2015. "The Missed Opportunity and Challenge of Capital Regulation," Research Papers 3386, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:3386
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Migueis, 2019. "Evaluating the AMA and the new standardized approach for operational risk capital," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(4), pages 302-311, December.
    2. Michael B. Imerman, 0. "When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-36.
    3. Marco Migueis, 2017. "Forward-looking and Incentive-compatible Operational Risk Capital Framework," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-087, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Katalin Mérő, 2017. "The Emergence of Macroprudential Bank Regulation: A Review," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 67(3), pages 289-309, September.
    5. Katalin Mérő, 2021. "The ascent and descent of banks’ risk-based capital regulation," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(4), pages 308-318, December.
    6. Douglas da Rosa München & Herbert Kimura, 2020. "Regulatory Banking Leverage: what do you know?," Working Papers Series 540, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    7. G. Gospodarchuk G. & Г. Господарчук Г., 2019. "Резервный буфер капитала как инструмент макропруденциальной политики // Reserve Capital buffer as an Instrument of Macroprudential Policy," Финансы: теория и практика/Finance: Theory and Practice // Finance: Theory and Practice, ФГОБУВО Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации // Financial University under The Government of Russian Federation, vol. 23(4), pages 43-56.
    8. Joseph Haslag, 2019. "On Processing Central Bank Communications: Can We Account for Fed Watching?," 2019 Meeting Papers 415, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Martijn Boermans & Bram van der Kroft, 2020. "Capital regulation induced reaching for systematic yield: Financial instability through fire sales," Working Papers 673, DNB.
    10. Rehbein, Oliver, 2018. "Flooded through the back door: Firm-level effects of banks' lending shifts," IWH Discussion Papers 4/2018, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    11. Michael B. Imerman, 2020. "When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(4), pages 1371-1406, November.
    12. Mérő, Katalin, 2018. "A kockázatalapú bankszabályozás előretörése és visszaszorulása - az ösztönzési struktúrák szerepe [The emergence and decline of risk-based bank regulation the role of incentive structures]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 981-1005.
    13. Muhamed Zulkhibri, 2019. "Macroprudential policy and tools in a dual banking system: Insights from the literature," Borsa Istanbul Review, Research and Business Development Department, Borsa Istanbul, vol. 19(1), pages 65-76, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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