IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecl/harjfk/rwp07-036.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) Is Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) about Analogy

Author

Listed:
  • Schauer, Frederick

    (Harvard U)

Abstract

Cognitive scientists and others who do research on analogical reasoning often claim that the use of precedent in law is an application of reasoning by analogy. In fact, however, law’s principle of precedent is quite different. The typical use of analogy, including the use of analogies to earlier decisions in legal argument, involves the selection of an analog from multiple candidates in order to help make the best decision now. But the legal principle of precedent requires that a prior decision be treated as binding, even if the current decision-maker disagrees with that decision. When the identity between a prior decision and the current question is obvious and inescapable, precedent thus imposes a constraint quite different from the effect of a typical argument by analogy. The importance of drawing this distinction is not so much in showing that a common claim in the psychological and cognitive science literature is mistaken, but that the possibility of making decisions under the constraints of binding precedent is itself an important form of decision-making that deserves to be researched in its own right.

Suggested Citation

  • Schauer, Frederick, 2007. "Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) Is Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) about Analogy," Working Paper Series rwp07-036, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp07-036
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=4940&type=WPN
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Scherer, Frederick, 2007. "Is There a Psychology of Judging?," Working Paper Series rwp07-049, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp07-036. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ksharus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.