On Representation and Weighted Utilitarian Representation of Preference Orders on Finite Utility Streams
AbstractIn this paper we re-examine the axiomatic basis of the key result on weighted utilitarian representation of preference orders on finite utility streams. We show that a preference order satisfying the axioms of Minimal Individual Symmetry, Invariance and Strong Pareto need not have a representation, and thus in particular a weighted utilitarian representation. The example establishing this result might also be of interest for the literature on the representation of preference orders. We then establish that whenever a preference order satisfying the axioms of Minimal Individual Symmetry, Invariance and Weak Pareto has a representation, it also has a weighted utilitarian representation. Our approach helps us to view the available results on the weighted utilitarian representation theorem from a different perspective.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics in its series Working Papers with number 10-05.
Date of creation: Jul 2010
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