Sustaining Collusion With Asymmetric Costs
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 with number 155.
Date of creation: 17 Sep 2004
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- Miklos-Thal, Jeanine, 2008.
"Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry,"
11044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ciarreta, Aitor & Gutierrez-Hita, Carlos, 2006. "Supply function vs. quantity competition in supergames," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 773-783, July.
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