AbstractDuring the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining de facto ownership of assets. This paper puts forward a theoretical model and econometric evidence on asset stripping in transition. We argue that it is driven by the value of the stripped assets, the probability of punishment and political power (the latter proxied by firm size). Using 1997 survey data for about 950 firms in five countries, we find that (1) firm size is a chief determinant of asset stripping and (2) there is strong support for the predicted non-linear relationship between potential profitability and the use of stripped assets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 with number 35.
Date of creation: 04 Jun 2003
Date of revision:
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asset stripping; transition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
- P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-06-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2003-06-16 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2003-06-16 (Public Economics)
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