Governments seem to influence the decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB. It's been argued that the publication of forecasts and minutes of the Governing Council's meetings would have a negative effect due to the influence of governments on their representatives' votes. In my model, such information reduces their influence and benefits the Executive Board. Governments benefit from the publication of minutes, while they sometimes disagree with respect to the forecasts. The model suggests that the EMU members may want to withhold the publication of forecasts when taking enlargement with a more heterogeneous group of countries into account.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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