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Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity

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  • Le Treust, Maël
  • Tomala, Tristan

Abstract

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel which has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. Imperfect communication entails a loss of payoff for the persuader. We establish an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight: if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base problem, then the persuader can achieve this bound arbitrarily closely by using strategies which tie all the problems together. We characterize this optimal payoff as a function of the information-theoretic capacity of the communication channel.

Suggested Citation

  • Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity," HEC Research Papers Series 1244, HEC Paris.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:1244
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3083932
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    Cited by:

    1. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
    2. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Constrained Information Design," Papers 1811.03588, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    3. Mark Whitmeyer, 2019. "Bayesian Elicitation," Papers 1902.00976, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian persuasion problem; imperfect communication channel;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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