This paper analyzes the impact of remittances sent by altruistic migrants on the labor supply of residents. The model is cast as a two-period game with asymmetric information about the residents' real economic situation. The optimal transfer depends on wages of both the donor and the recipient. Residents subject to a good economic situation may behave as if they were in a poor economic situation only in order to manipulate remitters' expectations. The latter, being aware of this risk, reduce the transferred amount accordingly. Therefore, in the equilibrium, residents who really are victims of the bad economic outlook, are penalized as compared to the perfect information set-up. In some circumstances, they can signal their type by drastically cutting working hours, thus further enhancing their precarity
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Paper provided by ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School in its series ESSEC Working Papers with number
DR 07001.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
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