Sweetening the Pot: How American Sugar Buys Protection
AbstractSugar growers have been capturing substantial rents from the U.S. sugar program. Despite well-documented huge welfare losses of this program, legislators have always voted against phasing it out. This paper uses Tobit analysis to explore the determinants of campaign contributions from the sugar industry to Senators from 1989 to 2002. It finds that the power and willingness of the Senators to protect influence the campaign contributions significantly: Membership on the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee attracts $4,266 of sugar contributions per two-year election cycle. The membership on the relevant subcommittee that deals with sugar legislation is even more important than membership of the agriculture committee: membership on the Agricultural Production, Marketing, and Stabilization of Prices Subcommittee is worth an additional $6,445. These results suggest the strength of the subcommittee in drafting specialized legislation and attracting interested members. Moreover, while the particular party affiliation does not make any difference, membership in the majority party is worth $1,235. Finally, an impressionable freshman Senator from a sugar cane state receives $8,366 more than a more senior senator from a non-sugar state.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Duke University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 03-08.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in a volume edited by Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-POL-2003-07-10 (Positive Political Economics)
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