Seeking Lobbying Rents
AbstractCombining rent-seeking and menu auction models allows the study of efficiency in a political economy where lobbying creates rents that politicians expend resources to obtain. Policy choices, lobbying, and rent-seeking are determined endogenously. When all interests lobby, equilibrium local public good provision and rents do not depend on who achieves office. Having only a fixed cost of rent-seeking replicates citizen candidate results. Generalizing the model, so additional expenditures have effect, reduces entrants and rent-seeking costs. Even when entry would suggest full rent dissipation, the small number of entrants to political contests gives rise to less.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Duke University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 02-34.
Date of creation: 2002
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-02-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2003-02-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2003-02-18 (Positive Political Economics)
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