Disentangling extrinsic and intrinsic motivations: the case of French GPs dealing with prevention
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- Philippe Batifoulier & Maryse Gadreau & Yves Arrighi & Yann Videau & Bruno Ventelou, 2009. "Disentangling extrinsic and intrinsic motivations: the case of French GPs dealing with prevention," Working Papers hal-04140879, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Frolich, Anne & Talavera, Jason A. & Broadhead, Peter & Dudley, R. Adams, 2007. "A behavioral model of clinician responses to incentives to improve quality," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 179-193, January.
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Keywords
General practitioners; Motivations; Prevention; Payment for performance; Intrinsic and extrinsic incentives; France;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HEA-2009-04-13 (Health Economics)
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