Responsabilité et indépendance du conseil d’administration : Les apports de l’analyse économique
AbstractBoard of directors independence has been a focus for a large series of studies in finance. The overall evidence suggests that independence has no or negative effect on firm performance. Director accountability constitutes a second topic of research, in law and economics. Two distinctive models might be identified. The first one gives primacy to the interests of shareholders, whereas the other advocates enlarged fiduciary duties for directors. We argue that these two issues (independence and accountability) are related. In particular, we show that independence is a strong implication only for the shareholder model of accountability. In turn, the way the poor results of independency are accounted for crucially depends on the way director accountability is analyzed.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX in its series EconomiX Working Papers with number 2008-37.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
corporate governance; board of directors; theory of the firm;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Valérie Mignon).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.