Stockage des permis de pollution en incertitude et règle de partage optimal de risques
AbstractThe well known economic advantage of tradable permits over command and control obviously vanish if firms do not trade because of policy uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty about changes in the permits program could make firms reluctant to invest in tradable permits. This article proposes to give optimal risk sharing rules in order to respond to policy risk. We show how banking of tradable permits can be used as a tool of policy risk control.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX in its series EconomiX Working Papers with number 2006-7.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Firm behavior; tradable permits; policy risk.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
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